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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to compare our empirical findings related to the level of disclosure ensured by corporate 
governance codes in force in European Union member states, by referring in this respect to OECD principles, with 
prior related research results. The comparative analysis is justified by the fact that our paper approached corporate 
governance form transparency and disclosure perspective, using other framework for comparison and a different 
methodology for measuring the disclosure level (Jaccard’s similarity coefficient) than those used in previous studies 
(Latent Semantic Analysis technique or the Leximetric one). The comparative analysis performed considered various 
features of corporate governance codes already studied, such as their issuer type or country’s legal regime. 
The research methodology used for achieving our goal is based on econometric analysis using various statistical 
tools, like descriptive analysis, mainly based on computing means, and correlations for identifying the relationship 
between our results and those of others researchers. 
The results of the performed analysis reveal that our empirical results, providing a disclosure index developed for all 
European Union member states, are not consistent with prior research findings related to disclosure as “primary 
theme” of corporate governance codes. On the other hand, by analysis these codes considering their issuer type we 
have reached to the same conclusion as other researchers interested on this same topic. Thus, those codes issued in 
collaboration of several institutions, coming from various economic fields, reached the highest level of disclosure, 
while those developed by industry or trade associations and groups proved to be the less interested in transparency. 
Similar was the conclusion reached after comparing the level of disclosure in corporate governance codes by 
grouping them according to countries’ legal regimes. The most relevant result in this respect is that Common law 
regime ensures the highest level of transparency through corporate governance requirements. 
Finally, we can assert that the compliance of corporate governance codes with OECD principles is consistent with 
prior research findings related to disclosure considering codes’ issuer type and countries’ legal regime. 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate governance has always been a controversial subject in various fields and consequently in the 
academic one, too. Many authors tried to define this concept from various perspectives, but unfortunately 
there is not a unique definition, yet. Moreover, different models of corporate governance have been 
developed along time. Thus, corporate governance became one of the most debated topic of discussions 
all around the world. The academic environment proved to be interested on this research topic all the time. 
One of the most important concerns of researchers was the convergence of corporate governance systems 
across countries, many surveys being focused on this aspect or at least being aimed to compare 
regulations enforced by different jurisdictions. Therefore, many questions related to convergence have 
been addressed along time, some of them receiving a more or less comprehensive answer, while others are 
still unsolved.  
Basing on this background, we aimed to provide a comparative analysis between some prior research 
findings and own empirical results as regards corporate governance codes by approaching these from a 
particular perspective that of transparency and disclosure, often blamed for the latest financial crisis. 
Moreover, unlike the most related research literature, which compared codes by referring to the Anglo-
Saxon model, often appreciated as the best model of corporate governance, our study makes use of 
another widely well-known framework (OECD), offering as a well a model of best practices through its 
principles. 
The paper proceeds as it follows. Firstly, we briefly review the literature regarding comparative studies 
on corporate governance codes and their convergence, hence reaching our main research question “Is 
corporate governance codes’ compliance with OECD principles consistent with prior research findings?” 
starting from this question, we developed our hypothesis considering three issues (disclosure theme 
weight of each code, its type of issuer and country’s legal regime), which were previously analyzed 
closely related to our particular approach on corporate governance. After explaining in detail the data 
collection method and analysis design, we test our hypotheses using information from corporate 
governance codes currently in force in all 27 European Union member states. Finally, we provide the 
research findings and discuss their implications, closely related to previous studies focused on the same 
goal. 
2. Literature review 
The wide prior international literature focused on corporate governance codes started from finding out 
what exactly constitutes convergence, trying to establish the major impediments that are standing in its 
way, finally looking for empirical evidence to prove that codes are moving towards or away from 
convergence [1]. Thus, many researches interested on this topic have been wondering if will ever exist 
convergence in corporate governance systems.  Because Anglo-American model of corporate governance 
was considered to be “the winner” [2], everyone expected to find substantial convergence toward it, being 
often used as a term of comparison [3], [4]. Starting from its primary objective of maximizing the 
shareholder value, many studies were conducted along time with the purpose of examining convergence 
based upon an international comparison of corporate governance provisions ability to protect various 
stakeholders, such as shareholders, especially the minority ones [5], creditors [6], investors [7], [8] and 
even workers [9]. 
Such studies lead to different types of convergence that have been distinguish along time, namely 
“functional”, “formal” and “contractual” convergence [10], “de jure” and “de facto” convergence [11], 
“hybrid convergence” [12], “normative convergence” [13] and “institutional convergence” [14]. 
Considering the aim of our study – the comparison analysis of corporate governance codes – we 
appreciate our study as a research on “de jure” convergence of corporate governance codes in force in 
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European Union member states towards a general accepted framework of good principles, issues by 
OECD.  
Similar previous studies focused on comparative analysis of corporate governance regulatory systems 
were mainly theoretical, prior literature providing little empirical evidence in this respect. These studies 
reveal that “there does seem to be convergence on certain common core principles based usually around 
the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance” [15], mainly due to the common elements introduced in 
major European regulations, as well as to the similarities in forthcoming legislation of the European 
directives [16]. On the other hand, the majority of the codes of the European Union countries are not in 
full accordance with the priorities of the European Commission [17]. This is the conclusion reached after 
an analysis performed for identifying to what extent the contents of these codes are driven by external 
(internationally accepted corporate governance best practices) or domestic (national institutions) forces.  
Among empirical research conducted before on this topic we should mention the attempts of analyzing 
European corporate governance codes on their content, variability and convergence, from different 
perspectives, like their theme, their issuer and legal regime. Various research methodologies have been 
used in this respect, like correlations [18] or a textual methodology based on Latent Semantic Analysis 
(LSA) [19]. Such studies manly reach to the conclusion that some elements of continental governance 
codes are converging to the U.K. model while others diverge, thus failing to find empirical evidence of 
“total” convergence towards Anglo-Saxon model.  
Another research methodology applied for measuring the convergence of corporate governance 
regimes across the countries was based on indices developed in this respect. Thus, [20] developed indices 
that indicate how well countries considered for sampled analysis (France, Germany, UK, US and India) 
protect shareholders, creditors and workers, by using 144 legal variables coded for each country-year, 
covering a relatively long time period (1970 to 2005). By calculating the differences between each 
variable in the law of a particular legal system, using “leximetrics” methodology [20], [21], the authors 
could conclude if there is a formal convergence, persistence, or divergence of rules, the general 
conclusion reached revealing that the laws have converged in shareholder protection, diverged in worker 
protection, and evened out in creditor protection. 
Other researchers [6] developed indices that indicate how the law in each country addresses various 
potential agency conflicts, using a unique database that comprises the main changes in corporate 
governance regulations in the US and all European countries between 1990-2005. Hence, empirical 
analysis is focused this time on a wide range of countries but covers a shorter period of time. Instead, 
information used for the performed analysis are more comprehensive, being based on the study of various 
corporate governance regulations, on the results from a detailed questionnaire sent to more than 150 legal 
experts, and on direct interviews with some of these experts. 
In contrast to the LLSV ranking system [22], the three new corporate governance indices that reflect 
the quality of national laws aimed at protecting corporate shareholders from being expropriated by 
management, minority shareholders from being expropriated by large block-holder, and creditors from 
being expropriated by shareholders, capture a broader scope of corporate governance regulation reforms 
and their dynamics.  
The conclusion reached reveal that countries of English legal origin still provide the highest quality of 
shareholder protection, while Continental European countries have improved their legal system up to the 
standard set by the English one, the dominant legal strategy across countries to address this protection 
being the improvement of corporate transparency. 
3. Hypotheses development 
Consequently, basing on these approaches on corporate governance codes’ comparison, we decided to 
use a different international guidance in this respect - OECD principles of corporate governance, whose 
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recommendations have the character of good governance principles, thus arising our main research 
question:  
Q: Is corporate governance codes compliance with OECD principles consistent with prior research 
findings? 
Looking for an answer to this question we briefly review prior related literature, upon its results 
identifying that codes developed by stock exchanges and governments have the strongest enforceability, 
thus being the most likely to effect actual governance practices [23], while codes in force in common law 
countries provide shareholders and creditors the greatest amount of protection against expropriation by 
insiders, unlike civil law countries that offer the least [22]. These findings reveal that corporate 
governance codes were analyzed before from various perspectives, like issuer’s identity [24], [25], code’s 
primary theme [26] or country’s legal regime [27], thus offering outlooks for our research.  
Accordingly, for performing our comparative analysis, we separate our sample of corporate 
governance codes in different groups according to prior research findings based on the above mentioned 
topics, hence arising the following hypotheses: 
H1: The compliance of corporate governance codes with OECD principles is consistent prior research 
findings related to disclosure as “codes’ primary theme”. 
H2: The compliance of corporate governance codes with OECD principles is consistent with prior 
research findings related to disclosure considering “countries’ legal regimes”. 
H3: The compliance of corporate governance codes with OECD principles is consistent with prior 
research findings related to disclosure considering “codes’ issuer type”. 
4. Empirical design and results 
4.1. Sample selection and variable measurement 
For achieving our goal we selected a sample of countries, made of all 27 European Union member 
states, whose corporate governance codes currently in force are available on the website of the European 
Corporate Governance Institute - an international scientific non-profit association promoting best practice 
on corporate governance issues, which was the main source of information for our research. 
For performing the comparative analysis with related research findings we considered one dependent 
variable revealing the level of disclosure and transparency in corporate governance codes compared with 
OECD requirements, and three independent variables, used in prior literature [22], [18].   
The dependent variable (D&T S_Index) is the Jaccard’s similarity index established for each corporate 
governance code, revealing the degree of similitude between them and OECD principles as regards the 
compliance with disclosure and transparency requirements and recommendations [28]. 
The independent variables are: 
- IT (Issuer Type), the following four identities being considered: “Composite”, made of groups 
that contain representatives from at least two of the subsequent groups, “Government”, referring 
to national legislatures or governmental commission/ministries, “Exchange”, represented by 
national stock exchanges and “Industry”, referring to industry or trade associations and groups, 
as in prior related literature [18]; 
- LR (Legal Regime), in this respect being used classifications made by both [22], who 
distinguished between “Common law”, “German civil”, “French civil”, “Former socialist” and 
“Scandinavian civil” and [18], who introduced two new legal regimes (“Baltic civil” and 
“Global governance practices”) instead of “Former socialist” and “Scandinavian civil”; 
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- DTW (Disclosure theme weight), which is represented by two themes (“Accounting/Disclosure” 
theme and “Shareholder protection” theme), identified by [18] in its sample of national codes of 
corporate governance, as being related to disclosure or transparency. 
The research methodology used, appropriate for such empirical studies, is based on comparative 
analysis, making use of econometric tools using SPSS software. 
4.2. Data analysis and hypotheses test results 
To ensure comparability between our empirical results and prior findings in order to test our first 
hypotheses, we reduced our sample just at the European Union member states previously analyzed [18], 
considering their classification according to the issuer’s type.  
Table 1 comprises a detailed situation of codes distribution across country, providing as well the 
values of disclosure index (D&T S_Index) and disclosure themes weight from prior related studies, 
comprising both “Accounting/Disclosure” theme and “Shareholder protection” theme. The reason of 
considering both themes for our comparison was the methodology of decomposing corporate governance 
codes using keywords most frequently occurred. Consequently, while “Accounting/Disclosure” theme is 
convincing by its name, “Shareholder protection” theme referred among others to disclosure, too. 
Table 1. Comparative analysis between “Disclosure” Indices 
Country D&T S_Index DTW1*) DTW2**)
Austria 0.605 0.450 0.040 
Hungary 0.605 0.070 0.110 
Luxembourg 0.605 0.410 0.080 
UK 0.579 0.290 0.350 
Slovakia 0.579 0.100 0.390 
Belgium 0.579 0.290 0.270 
Latvia 0.447 0.460 0.010 
Slovenia 0.447 0.280 0.160 
Greece 0.447 0.220 0.160 
Finland 0.447 0.030 0.180 
Poland 0.421 0.200 0.250 
Czech Republic 0.421 0.170 0.320 
Spain 0.395 0.320 0.330 
The Netherlands 0.395 0.220 0.230 
Portugal 0.368 0.030 0.080 
Sweden 0.289 0.040 0.210 
Romania 0.237 0.100 0.200 
Germany 0.211 0.440 0.120 
Estonia 0.211 0.490 0.060 
Italy 0.211 0.290 0.310 
France 0.184 0.150 0.370 
*) 
– these values represent “Accounting / Disclosure” theme weight 
**)
 – these values represent “Shareholder protection” theme weight  
according to [18] 
For performing the correlation analysis, we calculated Pearson coefficient that is usually used for 
measuring the strength of linear dependence between two variables, giving a value between “1”, that 
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describes the perfect direct relationship and “-1”, that reveals an indirect one, “0” value meaning that 
there is no linear correlation between variables. 
Table 2 shows the values of Pearson correlations among all considered variables: 
Table 2. Correlations between Disclosure index and related themes from prior literature 
  D&T S_Index DTW1 DTW2
D&T S_Index Pearson Correlation 1 .026 -.080 
 Sig. (2-tailed)  .912 .730 
 N 21 21 21 
The values of Pearson coefficient reveal that there is not any relationship between de dependent 
variable (D&T S_Index) and both independent ones (DTW1 and DTW2). Consequently, our first 
hypotheses (H1) is rejected. Thus, we cannot assert that the compliance of corporate governance codes 
with OECD principles is consistent prior research findings related to disclosure as “codes’ primary 
theme”. Looking for answer for this inconsistency we find as a possible explanation the wider extent of 
both themes identified in prior literature and considered as being related to disclosure and transparency, 
compared with the results of our OECD similarity analysis conducted.  
Thereby, the disclosure indices of “Accounting/Disclosure” theme (DTW1) were determined by 
considering other issues, more or less closer to the overall concept of disclosure, such as “supervisory”, 
“effective”, “audit”, “internal”, “controls”, “review” or “guidance”. The same explanation is valid for 
“Shareholder protection” theme (DTW2), too, among issued considered in this case being issued, other 
than those related to disclosure, too, like “committee”, “investor”, “rights”, “vote” or “chairman”. 
The situations appeared to be different when we considered for our analysis countries’ legal regimes, 
as these were defined in prior literature [18], [22]. This time, for performing the comparative analysis we 
determined an average value of the disclosure indices (D&T S_Index) of all countries classified in each of 
the five legal regimes defined, as well as an average value (DTW) of indices for DTW1 and DTW2.  
Table 3 and Table 4 show these values, separately for legal regimes identified by [22], as well as for 
those recently updated by [18]. 
Table 3. Distribution of codes across legal regimes and “disclosure” themes weight 
LR1*) Average D&T S_Index DTW1 DTW2 DTW**)
Common Law 0.579 28.98% 34.83% 31.91% 
Former Socialist 0.421 23.42% 18.72% 21.07% 
German civil 0.408 31.18% 10.55% 20.87% 
French civil 0.398 24.18% 22.89% 23.54% 
Scandinavian civil 0.368 4.18% 15.20% 9.69% 
*)
– these represent legal regimes defined by [22] 
**)
 - these values express the average of DTW1 and DTW2
Table 4. Distribution of codes across legal regimes and “disclosure” themes weight 
LR2*) Average D&T S_Index DTW1 DTW2 DTW**)
Common Law 0.579 28.98% 34.83% 31.91% 
Global Practices 0.421 12.71% 19.57% 16.14% 
German civil 0.408 44.27% 7.87% 26.07% 
French civil 0.395 25.10% 25.45% 25.26% 
Baltic civil 0.329 47.63% 3.44% 25.54% 
*)
– these represent legal regimes defined by [18] 
**)
 - these values express the average of DTW1 and DTW2
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As it can be seen, by comparing the average indices, the English corporate governance code (Common 
law) ranks first overall, thus being the most focused on promoting transparency and disclosure. Thus, our 
disclosure index reached the highest value of 0.579, in accordance with the average value (31,91%) of 
disclosure theme weights from prior findings. The less interest in this respect came from codes issued in 
countries being under Scandinavian civil (Finland and Sweden), D&T S_Index as well as DTW reaching 
the lowest values (0.368, respectively 9.69%). Corporate governance codes issued under German and 
French civil gave a medium attention to disclosure and transparency recommendations, D&T S_Index 
being very closer (0.408, respectively 0.398), thus being in accordance with [18] results. On the other 
hand, our finding are not consistent with the percentages for the new legal regimes defined by the same 
author. Thus, while our disclosure index shows the lower average value for Baltic civil (0.329), on the 
prior literature the last ranked is Global Governance Practices regime (16.14%). Consequently, our 
second hypotheses (H2) is partially accepted. Thus, we can assert that the compliance of corporate 
governance codes with OECD principles is consistent with prior research findings related to disclosure 
considering “countries’ legal regimes” 
Our last hypotheses is of great importance, too, considering prior literature, which shows that 
corporate governance codes’ issuers varies across countries [23], [24], [25], and consequently it might 
influence importance given to disclosure and transparency requirements settled. The latest empirical 
evidence in this respect reveals differences between codes by comparing the relative importance given to 
various issues (including disclosure ones), after classifying the codes into particular groups [18]. Basing 
on their findings showing “disclosure” theme weight on each type of issuer defined, our paper is aimed to 
compare it with the importance given to disclosure and transparency requirements by each group of 
codes, expressed by the average value of D&T S_Index.   
Table 5 provides data on distribution of codes across issuer type and “disclosure” theme weight, 
respectively the average values of disclosure index. 
Table 5. Distribution of codes across issuer type and “disclosure” theme weight 
IT*) Average D&T S_Index DTW 
Composite 0.592 41.78% 
Exchange 0.417 34.18% 
Government 0.394 29.03% 
Industry 0.368 9.76% 
*) 
- these categories represent codes issuer types according to [18] 
Values of the average disclosure index are consistent with prior findings, which reveal that the 
“composite” group focused on “accounting and disclosure” weighted this dimension of corporate 
governance more highly than any other issuer, being followed by “exchange” and “government” issued 
codes that also placed high emphasis on this theme. However, our index show higher values for all types 
of issuers and, unlike prior findings, little difference between “government” and “industry” issued codes. 
Anyway, the importance given to “disclosure” by each type of issuer shows the same order, thereby 
allowing us to accept our last hypotheses (H3). Thus, we can assert that the compliance of corporate 
governance codes with OECD principles is consistent with prior research findings related to disclosure 
considering “codes’ issuer type”. 
5. Findings and conclusions 
Corporate governance codes have been the subject of many studies, most of them looking for a best 
model toward all these might converge. Thus, generally, these codes have been analyzed as a whole, by 
referring mostly to the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance. Unlike these studies, our paper 
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presents a different approach of corporate governance codes, providing a more comprehensive analysis on 
the particular issue of transparency and disclosure, by referring to a different framework – OECD 
principles of corporate governance. All these ensure originality to our paper, giving also the possibility to 
compare our empirical results with prior literature findings, which was the main aim of our study. 
The results of the performed analysis provide an affirmative answer to our research question: “Is 
corporate governance codes compliance with OECD principles consistent with prior research findings?” 
Our answer is mainly justified by the status of the hypothesis formulated, excepting the first one, all of 
the rest being accepted. 
Consequently, we did not find any correlation between the disclosure indexed resulted from our 
empirical study and the importance given to disclosure by each corporate governance code assessed by 
other authors through the weight of this theme in the whole text of regulations. But, on the other hand, 
after grouping corporate governance codes firstly according to each country’s legal regime, and secondly 
to codes’ issuer type, we reached to the conclusion that our findings are consistent with prior related 
research results.  
Thus, Common law legal regime proved to ensure the highest level of disclosure in corporate 
governance codes, while Scandinavian civil codes were the less interested in this respect. Corporate 
governance codes in force in countries being under German or French civil had a medium level of 
disclosure. The new legal regimes recently defined by [18] lead us to opposite results than prior findings 
of the same author. Thus, while our disclosure index shows the lower average value for Baltic civil, on 
the prior literature the last ranked is Global Governance Practices regime. 
As regards the issuer’s type, those codes developed in collaboration of several institutions, coming 
from various economic fields, reached the highest level of disclosure, while corporate governance codes 
issued by industry or trade associations are in the last place, but much closer to previous group than prior 
research findings. 
In conclusion, the performed empirical analysis provided consistent evidence, therefore allowing us to 
accept two of our hypothesis (H2 and H3) and to reject one of these (H1). Finally, we can assert that the 
compliance of corporate governance codes with OECD principles is consistent with prior research 
findings related to disclosure considering codes’ issuer type and countries’ legal regime. 
Acknowledgements 
This work was supported from the European Social Fund through Sectoral Operational Programme 
Human Resources Development 2007-2013, project number POSDRU/1.5/S/59184 „Performance and 
excellence in postdoctoral research in Romanian economics science domain”, Babeú-Bolyai University 
Cluj-Napoca being a partner within the project. 
References 
[1] Yoshikawa, T. and Rasheed, A. A. (2009), Convergence of Corporate Governance: Critical Review 
and Future Directions, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17: 388–404. 
[2] Hansmann, H. & Kraakman, R. (2004), The End of History for Corporate Law, Convergence and 
persistence in corporate governance, Cambridge University Press, 33-68. 
[3] Coffee, J. (1999), The future as history: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate 
Governance and its Implications, Northwestern University Law Review, 93: 641-707. 
[4] Goergen, M. and Renneboog, L. (2008), Contractual Corporate Governance, Journal of corporate 
finance, 14(3): 166-182. 
[5] Bebchuk, L. and Roe, M. (2000), A Theory of Path Dependence of Corporate Ownership and 
Governance, Stanford Law Review, 52: 775-808 
1310  Cristina Alexandrina S‚tefa˘nescu / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 24 (2011) 1302–1310
[6] Martynova, M. and Renneboog, L. (2010), Corporate Governance Index: Convergence and 
Diversity of National Corporate Governance Regulations, ECGI Finance, Discussion paper 2010-17:1-35. 
[7] Cernat, L. (2004), The Emerging European Corporate Governance Model: Anglo-Saxon, 
Continental, or Still the Century of Diversity?, Journal of European Public Policy, 11(1): 147-166. 
[8] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (2002), Investor Protection and 
Corporate Valuation, Journal of Finance, 57: 1147-1170. 
[9] Siems, M.M. (2009), Convergence in Corporate Governance - A Leximetric Approach, The 
Journal of Corporation Law, 35(4): 729-756. 
[10] Gilson, R. J. (2000), Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 
Stanford Law School, Working paper, no. 192: 1-35. 
[11] Khanna, T., Kogan, J. and Palepu, K. (2006), Globalization and Similarities in Corporate 
Governance: A Cross-Country Analysis, Review of Economics and Statistics, 88(1): 69-90. 
[12] Rose, P. (2001), EU Company Law Convergence Possibilities After Centros, Transnational Law 
and Contemporary Problems, 11: 120-139. 
[13] Milhaupt, C.J. (2001), Creative Norm Destruction: The Evolution of Nonlegal Rules in Japanese 
Corporate Governance, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 6(149): 1-36. 
[14] Chamy, D. (1998), The German Corporate Governance System, Columbia Business Law Review, 
1: 145-165. 
[15] Mallin, C. A. (2004), Corporate Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 207. 
[16] Wymeersch, E. (2002), Convergence or divergence in corporate governance patterns in Western 
Europe? in J. A. McCahery et al. (2002), Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 230–250. 
[17] Hermes, N., Postma, T.J.B.M. and Zivkov, O. (2006), Corporate Governance Codes in the 
European Union: Are They Driven by External or Domestic Forces?, International Journal of Managerial 
Finance, 2(4): 280 – 301. 
[18] Cicon, J.E., Ferris, S.P., Kammel, A.J and Noronha, G. (2010), European Corporate Governance: 
A Thematic Analysis of National Codes of Governance, European Financial Management, doi: 
10.1111/j.1468-036X.2010.00542.x. 
[19] Deerwester, S., Dumais, S. T., Furnas, G. W., Landauer, T. K. and Harshman, R. (1990), Indexing 
by Latent Semantic Analysis, Journal of the American Society for Information Science, 41(6): 391-407. 
[20] Siems, M.M (2008), Shareholder Protection Around the World (Leximetric II), Delaware Journal 
of Corporate Law 33: 111-147. 
[21] Lele, P. and Siems, M.M (2007), Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric Approach, Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies, 17: 17-50. 
[22] LaPorta, R., F. Lopez de Silanes, F., Schleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1997), Legal Determinants of 
External Finance, Journal of Finance, 52: 1131-1150. 
[23] Aguilera, R. and Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2004), Codes of Good Governance Worldwide: What is the 
Trigger?, Studies in Organizational Management, 25(3), 415-443. 
[24] Enrione, A., Mazza, C., and Zerboni, F. (2006), Institutionalizing Codes of Governance, 
American Behavioral Scientist, 49: 961-973. 
[25] Zattoni, A. and Cuomo, F. (2008), Why Adopt Codes of Good Governance? A Comparison of 
Institutional and Efficiency Perspectives, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 16: 1-15. 
[26] Cicon, J.E., Ferris, S.P., Kammel, A.J and Noronha, G. (2010), Soft Information and European 
Corporate Governance – the Contributions of Textual Analysis, Proceedings of the 19th International 
Scientific Conference, Faculty of Economics and Management, Prague, Czech Republic, pp.  29-33. 
[27] Denis, D.K and McConnell, J.J (2003), International Corporate Governance, Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis, 38: 1-36. 
[28] ùtefănescu, C. (2011), Disclosure and transparency in E.U. corporate governance codes vs. OECD 
- empirical comparative approach, Working paper, submitted for review. 
